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Abstract: 
 
 
Research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making 
decisions against their own good intentions. In these situations, the government might want to 
intervene, indeed individuals might want the government to intervene, to induce behavior that is 
closer to what individual wish they were doing. The analysis of such corrective interventions, 
through taxes and subsidies, might be called ”behavioral public economics.” However, such 
analysis, where the government has an objective function that is different from that of 
individuals, is not new in public economics. In these cases the government is said to be ”non-
welfarist” in its objectives, and there is a long tradition of non-welfarist welfare economics, 
especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual 
behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the 
outcomes. The object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non-welfarist 
optimal taxation literature and, secondly, to present behavioral public economics as a natural 
special case of this general framework.  
 
 
Key words: non-welfarism, optimal taxation, behavioral economics 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Behavioral economics has highlighted a widespread phenomenon. In different ways and in 
different contexts, individuals do not seem to behave in the manner of text book rational choice 
models. This has major implications for positive economic analysis, as the apparatus of 
behavioral economics has been brought to bear in explaining a number of empirical phenomena 
that are not consistent with standard rational choice models.1 It also has implications for 
normative analysis. For example, limited self control may lead to overconsumption of alcohol 
and drugs and underinvestment in human capital. In situations like these individuals might 
benefit if an outsider induced them to behave according to preferences they wish they had. This 
outsider could be the government, and the inducements might be through tax and subsidy 
policies. A new kind of market imperfection, mistakes in individual behavior, brings us, then, to 
the realm of public economics—specifically, behavioral public economics. 
 
Behavioral public economics is a rapidly expanding field whose central focus is on public policy 
when individual preferences differ from social ones.2 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) consider 
optimal paternalistic taxes that the government imposes to correct individual behavior regarding 
consumption of harmful goods. Sheshinski (2003) proposes a general model with faulty 
individual decision making, where restricting individuals' choices leads to welfare 
improvements. Kanbur et al (2004) examine taxation under income uncertainty when individuals 
behave according to the tenets of prospect theory, but the government uses expected utility 
theory to evaluate the outcomes of this behavior. The situation in the normative part of this 
                                                 
1 For surveys of the literature, see Camerer and Lowenstein (2004) and Rabin (2002).  
2 A general discussion is to be found in Camerer et al (2003). 
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research agenda is, therefore, one where market behavior is generated by one set of preferences, 
but the society evaluates it with respect to another set of preferences. 
 
In many respects, the situation described above is fairly common in welfare and normative 
public economics. Perhaps the most well-known example is the analysis of so-called merit goods 
(Sandmo 1983, Besley 1988). The consumption of these goods, in the viewpoint of the 
government, is meritorious and should be encouraged or imposed, ignoring individual choice. 
Optimal taxation when the government attempts to alleviate poverty (e.g. Kanbur et al 1994a) is 
another application of a much larger literature on “non-welfarist” public economics, where the 
social planner explicitly uses some other criterion for evaluating an individual’s welfare than the 
preferences of that individual.3 
 
The object of this paper is to provide a unified framework for non-welfarist optimal taxation, 
expanding the seminal work by Seade (1980), and to then view the recent interest in behavioral 
public economics in light of this framework. It will be seen that the general results of the non-
welfarist public economic literature provide a useful guide and framework for developing the 
specific analysis called for by the new behavioral economics. We will not touch upon the 
question of how one can make reliable inference on individual utility when decision making 
contains mistakes and utility is time dependent. This serious and extremely difficult question is 
discussed in depth by Bernheim and Rangel (2004). Rather, we will take the two sets of 
preferences—the ones individuals have and the ones they wish they had, or in any event the ones 
the government evaluates outcomes with—as given and examine their consequences for optimal 
taxation. 
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The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 first presents a general model of non-welfarist 
optimal non-linear taxation. It highlights in particular the difference between the standard second 
best case for distortionary taxation from the paternalistic case when private and public 
preferences differ. It then illustrates specific analyses in the literature as special cases of the 
general formulation. Section 3 presents a general model of non-welfarist mixed taxation, where 
income is taxed on non-linear scale and commodities on a linear scale. It also discusses merit 
goods and commodity taxation. Section 4 turns to behavioral public economics and shows how 
recent discussions fit into the standard non-welfarist framework. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Non-welfarist optimal non-linear income taxation with two goods 
2.1 The general model 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a general non-welfarist formulation of income tax 
problem which unifies special cases which have been studied in non-welfarist tax literature. The 
aim is to bring out their common structure and results. We concentrate here on a general case of 
non-linear taxation, but to make the arguments clear, we examine a two good case (e.g. labor and 
leisure).4 The analysis builds on the information-based approach to optimal tax policy, initiated 
by Mirrlees (1971), where the availability of instruments is restricted on the basis of what the 
government can observe. The income-earning ability of taxpayers is hidden information, but the 
government can observe income and design a general, non-linear, tax schedule based on that.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Perhaps at some level one could also argue that redistribution – where the government can evaluate individual 
welfare in a different way than the individuals themselves – and correction of externalities are additional examples 
in which the social welfare function differs from the individual utility. 
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There is a continuum of individuals, each having the same preference ordering, which is represented 
by a utility function ),( yxuu =  over consumption x and hours worked y, with 0>xu  and 
0<yu . Individuals are otherwise identical, but they differ in their income-earning ability, or the 
wage rate, n. Workers differ only in the pre-tax wage n they can earn. There is a distribution of n on 
the interval ( nn, ) represented by the density function )(nf . Gross income is given by nyz = . 
 
Individuals maximize utility subject to the budget constraint: 
 ),(max
,
yxu
yx
 subject to )(nyTnyx −= , (1) 
where T depicts the non-linear tax schedule set by the government. The necessary condition of 
(1) is given by 
 0/)'1( =+− nuTu yx , (2) 
where 'T  depicts the marginal tax schedule set by the government. This individual optimization 
condition gives the self-selection constraint for the government optimization problem. Totally 
differentiating utility with respect to n, and making use of workers utility maximization 
condition, we obtain the incentive compatibility constraints, 
 ),,( nyxu
n
yu
dn
du
n
y ≡−= ,5 (3) 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Non-linear taxation with many goods would yield essentially similar results. The results differ more between 
completely non-linear and mixed taxation case. Mixed taxation is dealt with in Section 3. 
5 The first-order condition of individual’s optimization problem is only a necessary condition for the individual's 
choice to be optimal, but we assume here that it is sufficient as well. Assumptions that assure sufficiency are provided 
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In sum, the way the individual optimization is modelled is therefore completely similar to the 
approach in welfarist tax literature. Note that below we will use the same model to examine 
behavioural economics applications where individuals can make mistakes. Yet, it is assumed that 
individuals are perfectly rational when assessing the self-selection constraint. That individuals 
can make mistakes with respect to incentive compatibility constraint as well is clearly a 
somewhat different topic from the one we consider. This is examined further in Sheshinski 
(2002).  
 
It is usual in optimal tax theory to assume an additively separable individualistic welfare 
function. One can of course allow for any increasing transformation of individual utilities here, 
so as to capture a greater or lesser concern with inequality on the part of the government. 
Suppose, therefore, that the aim of policy can be expressed as maximizing the following social 
evaluation criterion (allowing for non-individualistic preferences) 
 ∫=
n
n
dnnfnyxPS )(),,( , (4) 
where )(.,nPP = , following Seade (1980), is ”the social utility” derived from an n-individual’s 
consumption and labor (leisure), which may in particular coincide with, or be related in some 
special form to, )(.,nu . S  is restricted to be additively separable in individual utilities, but the 
                                                                                                                                                             
by Mirrlees (1976). Note also that while we here presume an internal solution for y, (3) remains valid even if 
individuals were bunched at 0=y  since, for them, 0=dndu . 
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formulation still allows e.g. the social welfare to depend on any linear form on utilities or on 
specific goods such as income.6  
 
The government cannot observe individuals’ productivities and thus is restricted to setting taxes and 
transfers as a function only of earnings, ))(( nzT . Inverting direct utility then gives ),( yuhx = ,  
where  
 
x
y
y u
u
h −=     ,       
x
u u
h 1= , (5) 
Defining, too, ),),,((),,( nyyuhunyug n= , it is straightforward to check that 
 
x
nx
unxy u
u
gsnug =−= , , (6) 
where we have defined the variable 0)/,(/)/,( >−= nzxnunzxus xy to denote the marginal rate of 
substitution between  x and y. Preferences are taken to satisfy the further restriction that  .0<ns  
This is assumption B of Mirrlees (1971) and the Agent Monotonicity assumption of Seade (1982). It 
implies that indifference curves in consumption-gross income space become flatter the higher is an 
individual’s wage rate, which in turn ensures that both consumption and gross earnings increase 
with the wage rate.  
 
                                                 
6 The individualistic form of the welfare function has been criticized, most notably by Sen (1985), as unable to meet 
in many instances common-sense notion of equality, which would generally relate to distribution of consumption, 
i.e. directly to quantities not necessarily through utilities (non-welfarism). 
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Since xnyT −= , we can think of government as choosing schedules y(n) and x(n). In fact it is 
easier to think of it choosing a pair of functions, u(n) and y(n), which maximizes index (4) subject to 
the incentive compatibility condition (3) and the revenue requirement ∫ = RdnnfnzT )()]([ . 
Introducing multipliers λ  and )(nµ  for the budget constraint and incentive compatibility 
constraint, and integrating by parts, the Lagrangean becomes 
 ∫ −+−−−+= nn nunnundngunfxnyyxPL )()()()()')())(),((( µµµµλ , (7) 
Differentiating with respect to u and y gives the first-order conditions  
 0)()(')()( =−−−=
x
nx
uxu u
u
nnnfhPL µµλ , (8) 
 0)()())(( =+−++= nxyyyxy snunnfhnPhPL µλ , (9) 
Dividing (9) by fλ , using (2) and (5) and rearranging, (9) becomes  
 fsun
nP
P
sPnzT nx
x
y
x λµλ /)(/))(())((' −−= , (10) 
where  
 .)()/exp()/1)(()( dppfnuuuPn
n
p
xnx
n
n
xx ∫∫ −+= λµ , (11) 
is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint. This latter satisfies the transversality 
conditions  
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 0)()( == nn µµ , (12) 
and 
 0)( >nµ , for  ),( nnn∈ , (13) 
The optimal marginal tax rate formula (11) can be rewritten in a slightly different form in 
comparison to the original Mirrlees (1971) optimal tax model 
 fsunssPnzT nx
p
x λµλ /)(/))(())((' −−= , (14) 
where 
x
yp
nP
P
s −= denotes the social (paternalist) marginal rate of substitution. The second term 
at the right is familiar from the welfarist literature, whereas the first term is novel. It captures the 
social value of divergence between private and social preferences, and is therefore called the 
paternalistic motive for taxation. It could also be called a first-best motive for taxation, as it 
corrects the individual activity to correspond to social preferences. The conventional term, the 
second at the right of (14), represents in turn the second-best motive for marginal distortion, 
arising from the asymmetric information.  
 
In the end points of income distribution, the second term at the right is zero, and the marginal tax 
is completely determined by paternalistic motives. Suppose, for instance, that the social planner 
regards very high incomes unwanted per se.  In this case ss p > . Therefore, the marginal tax rate 
at the top is positive, despite the fact that this policy is not Pareto efficient. The marginal tax rate 
is used as a device to correct ‘unwanted’ social outcomes. 
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The sign of the marginal rate will depend on the interaction between these terms. We might think 
of a government with redistributive goals, but its views on working are more “Calvinistic” or 
“puritanical” than taxpayers so that it would like to see people work harder and earn more. In his 
case ss p < . As is known from Mirrlees (1971) the second term implies a non-negative marginal 
tax rate. The first term in turn implies a marginal subsidy as a incentive to promote labor supply. 
At the top the marginal tax rate is negative. Hence the property of welfarist optimal income tax – 
the non-negativity of marginal rate – no longer holds.  
 
2.2  Special cases 
 
Poverty reduction  
Much of the attention of non-welfarist approaches has focused on a particular form of non-
welfarism, namely poverty reduction. Policy discussion on poverty alleviation and the targeting 
of social policy often concentrates almost exclusively on income. Little weight is typically given 
to issues like the disutility the poor experience when working. Indeed, sometimes work 
requirements are seen in a positive light, as is often the case with workfare. This is in marked 
contrast with conventional, utility-based, objectives in optimal income taxation literature. 
Therefore it is worthwhile to examine the implications of poverty reduction objectives on 
optimal income tax rules.7 It must also be remembered that the dividing line between welfarism 
and non-welfarism is not very clear. Conventional tax analysis utilizes social welfare functions 
with inequality aversion, which already implies a deviation of assessing individual welfare with 
                                                 
7 The literature makes clear that it does not necessarily advocate these objectives; rather the aim is to explore their 
implications.  
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the same function which the individual uses himself. In some sense, the social objective 
functions form a continuum in the welfarism – non-welfarism scale.  
 
Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994a) examine the properties of the Mirrlees-type optimal income 
tax model, when the government objective is alleviation of income poverty. 8 Instead of social 
welfare maximization, the government aims to minimize an income-based poverty index of the 
general additively separable form  
 ∫= dnnfxnxGS )(*]),([ , (15) 
where *x  is the poverty line. G is non-negative for *xx <  and zero otherwise. It satisfies the 
following properties 
 *),0(0,0 xxGG xxx ∈∀>< . (16) 
This specification captures a number of widely-used poverty measures, such as the headcount 
ratio and the Gini-based measure of Sen (1976). Note that while it has a similarity with a 
Rawlsian social welfare function (focusing on the poor), poverty index depends only on income. 
In the Rawlsian difference principle, an individual’s well-being is judged according to an index 
of primary goods.9 The social evaluation function (4) reduces to (15). That is 
*),(),,( xxGnyxP = . Here 0=yP  and xx GP = . 
 
                                                 
8 Kanbur and Keen (1989) analyse what kind of linear income tax schedules could be used to alleviate poverty, 
while Besley and Kanbur (1988) analyse commodity tax/subsidy rules  (when no income taxation is available) for 
poverty alleviation. Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994b) and Bradbury (2002) offer surveys.  
9 Economists have, however, narrowed Rawls’s theory into one which allocates according to ‘maximin utility’. 
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The government minimizes (15) subject to the self-selection constraint and the government 
budget constraint.  The optimal marginal tax rate in (11) now becomes  
 
f
susGT nxx λ
µ
λ −=' , (17) 
where λ  and µ  denote the Lagrange multipliers of the budget constraint and incentive 
compatibility constraint, respectively, and s is the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and income. The second term at the right of (17) is similar to the marginal tax rule 
derived in a welfarist setting, with the exception that terms are evaluated at a different optimum. 
The first term at the right is novel and captures poverty minimization objectives. At the lower 
end of income distribution this term is negative ( 0<xG ), pointing to lower marginal tax rates on 
the working poor. However, because the interaction with the other terms, one cannot at the 
analytical level compare the income tax rates to those derived in welfarist framework. 
 
A clear-cut result emerges at the lowest end of the income distribution. If some amount of work 
is always desirable,10 the second term at the right vanishes. This gives rise to the observation in 
the welfarist model that the marginal tax rate at the bottom of the income distribution is zero.11 
However, in the poverty alleviation case, the first term at the right remains, and the marginal tax 
rate for the lowest earner is negative. Over some interval at the bottom of the wage distribution, 
the marginal tax rate derived in the poverty alleviation case is therefore lower than in the 
conventional welfarist case. This policy, via inducing the poor to work and earn more, 
contributes to poverty reduction. The finding is potentially important in policy terms, motivating 
                                                 
10 This is the so-called no bunching case. 
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the use of wage subsidies (such as the earned income tax credit in the US). Notice that the policy 
outlined above would not necessarily raise welfare, because of the forgone leisure. Its 
desirability arises from the fact that the social planner does not evaluate its policy based on 
individual utility, but uses a different, non-welfarist notion.  
 
Bradbury (2002) points out that policy discussion often goes beyond this, giving a negative 
weight to leisure. One reason for this is paternalism. Compulsion to work may be seen as the 
individuals’ best interests, for instance because of learning-by-doing reasons that the individuals 
fail to see. Another reason is related to notions of obligation and reciprocity. The recipients of 
the welfare benefits have ‘no rights without responsibilities’. They may have a responsibility to 
work to be entitled to social welfare programs, irrespective of the desirability of the work for 
themselves. 
 
Other non-welfarist optimal tax analysis 
Schokkaert et al (2003) examine in more detail the consequences of non-utilitarian motives for 
optimal income taxation in a framework where individuals differ in two respects: their income-
earning ability (as in the conventional tax model) and in their taste for leisure. Here the social 
planner may have a different idea than the individuals themselves about the ‘correct’ or 
‘reasonable’ preferences for leisure. The social planner may, for instance, want to restrict the 
hours worked to protect the workers from exhaustion or to impose limits to work (and 
consumption) for ecological reasons. The latter motivation can also be related to quality-of-life 
vs. material welfare considerations.  
                                                                                                                                                             
11 The marginal tax rate at the higher end of income distribution is also zero. This conclusion holds also in the 
poverty reduction framework (inasmuch the highest earner is not poor).  
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They assume that individual preferences between income and labour supply take the following, 
quasi-linear, form: 
 ε
ε
ε
ε
ε +−
+−=
11
01
1),( yy
e
nynyxu , (18) 
where ε  is the constant elasticity of labor supply and e represents a idiosyncratic taste parameter 
for leisure. The social planner, on the other hand, evaluates welfare using an ‘advantage’ 
function 
 ε
ε
ε
ε
ε +−
+−=
11
01
1),( yy
g
nynyxa , (19) 
where individual preferences for leisure, e, are replaced by social preferences, g.  If g reaches 
infinity, the social welfare depends on income alone, while eg <  represents the case, discussed 
above, where social planner attaches larger weight to quality of life than the individual.  
 
The purpose of Schokkaert et al (2003) is to compare how optimal linear income tax derived 
using the advantage function differs from a welfarist solution, calculated using Rawlsian social 
welfare function. A decrease in g leads to higher tax rates, because the social planner attaches a 
higher disadvantage to labor, which it therefore wants to discourage more. Using an illustration 
based on Belgian data, they demonstrate how these considerations can have a sizable effect on 
the desirable tax rate, if labor supply elasticity is small enough.12 
                                                 
12 The paper also departs from the traditional welfarist literature by considering ’responsibility-sensitive’ 
egalitarianism, due to Roemer (1998), where individuals should only be compensated for differences in their innate 
skill levels, while they should be responsible for their preferences for leisure. Introducing these concerns leads 
typically to smaller tax rates than in the welfarist case.  
  16
In terms of our general non-linear non-welfarist formulation of income tax problem, the case 
studied by Schokkaert et al (2003) would mean that xx uP =  but yy uP ≠ . Now the marginal tax 
formula (11) becomes 
 fsun
nu
P
sunzT nx
x
y
x λµλ /)(/))(())((' −−= . (20) 
Now suppose ⇔−<−
x
y
x
y
nu
P
nu
u
 
x
y
x
y
nu
P
nu
u > . Hence this leads to higher marginal rates, because 
the government discourages labor supply. 
 
3.  Non-welfarist optimal mixed taxation 
3.1 The general model 
 
This section considers a mixed taxation case where income is taxed in a non-linear fashion, but 
commodities are taxed on a linear scale. Thus, we analyze a similar situation than in Mirrlees 
(1976) but with a non-welfarist government objective. The tax policy tools include a non-linear 
income tax )(nyT  and commodity taxes (tax vector) pqt −= , where ,...),( 21 ppp = = 
producer’s prices and ,...),( 21 qqq = =  consumer’s prices. An individual n’s budget constraint is 
)(zTzqx −= , where x is a vector of commodities subject to linear taxation.  
 
The consumer’s optimization problem remains the same as above, with the modification that a 
given income can now be spent over multiple commodities. The government optimizes the non-
welfarist objective function by choosing linear commodity taxes and non-linear income tax 
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optimally, subject to a self-selection constraints of the individuals and a budget constraint 
{ }∫ =+ RdnnfnqtxnzT )(),()]([ . 
 
Household optimization will be used to generate the incentive compatibility constraint for the 
government optimization. In the case where one good only is subject to non-linear taxation, an n-
individual maximizes u subject to )(zTyqx −= . Define utility as a function of the optimally 
chosen commodities (satisfying the first-order conditions of individual optimization) 
),,(max)( nzxunv = . Differentiating this function with respect to n and combining this with the 
first order conditions of individual optimization, we have the familiar envelope condition as in 
(3) 
 ),,( nzxu
n
yu
dn
du
n
y ≡−= , (21) 
Because of the need to deal with both non-linear and linear price structures, it is helpful to apply 
dual techniques to solve the optimization problem. We utilize partial expenditure and indirect 
utility functions, first discussed by Mirrlees (1976). Let the expenditure function for household 
be [ ]vnyxuqxvnzqE == ),,(:min),,,(  and the partially indirect utility function 
[ ]bqxnzxunzbqv == :),,(max),,,( , where expenditure on linearly-taxed goods is b = E. 
 
By substituting Hicksian demand ( cq xE = ) into (21) we can eliminate x from (21). The resource 
constraint for this economy is  
 Afdwpxz c =−∫ )( , (22) 
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where ),,,( nvzqxx cc =  (= qE ). The Lagrangean of the government optimization problem can 
then be written as 
 { } )()()()('))(]),,,,([(
}'))(]),,,,([{(
nvnnvndnuvfpxzznvzqxP
dnuvfpxzznvzqxPL
n
cc
n
cc
µµαµλ
αµλ
+−+−−+=
++−+=
∫
∫ , (23) 
where the latter formulation follows from integrating 'vµ  by parts. Maximizing with respect to q 
yields the following first-order condition 
 0)}({ =∂∂+− ∫∫ dnqufpxfdwxP ncqcqx µλ ,  (24) 
where cx x
PP ∂
∂= . Equation (24) can be rewritten as13 
 ∫∫∫ −−= fdnnvyqxPdnnybqxnfdnxt cqxncq ),,,(1),,,()( λπ , (25) 
where 0/ >= λµπ Ev .14 The expression in (24) is an implicit formulation for the optimal 
commodity tax structure. The left-hand side of this formulation measures, as pointed out by 
Mirrlees (1976), the extent to which commodity taxation encourages/discourages consumption of 
different commodities. The first term on the right is similar than in Mirrlees (1976). It links the 
‘index of discouragement’ at the left to the differences in consumption of a particular good 
among people with different abilities, n.  
 
                                                 
13 See Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004) for details. 
14 The income tax is also assumed to be optimally chosen. 
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3.2  The poverty minimization case 
 
The second term at the right is novel. To interpret it we take the case of minimization of poverty 
as in Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004). The social welfare maximization is now equal to minimizing a 
poverty/deprivation index, which must now be extended the capture the many-good situation and 
it is given by 
 [ ]∫−= dnnfnqxcDP )(),(,π , (26) 
where ** xc π=  is a reference consumption bundle to which actual consumption level xπ  is 
compared. Consumer prices are depicted by q, and π  denotes the shadow prices used in poverty 
measurement.15 As earlier, 0<xD . 
 
Consider a case where good i is included in the deprivation measure and the tax (consumer price) 
of good j is increased. Then the index of discouragement at the left measures the discouragement 
of the consumption of j. If these goods are complements, then 0<cqx , and the consumption of 
good j is encouraged. Likewise, if i and j are substitutes, i.e. 0>cqx , the consumption of good j is 
discouraged through the tax system. Finally, since the compensated own price effect is always 
negative, the consumption of goods that itself enter the deprivation measure should be 
encouraged.  
                                                 
15 Technological reasons would suggest using producer prices p, so that tqppx −== , where t denotes 
commodity taxes. Emphasis on the purchasing power of the poor would support the use of consumer prices. But 
there can be other weights attached to different commodities. One may include only some necessities with their 
producer prices, but goods that are not included in the target vector have zero weights. 
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The intuition for the second term at the right of (25) is straightforward. If a good is included in 
the deprivation index, a decrease in its price leads to an increase in its consumption, and thus to a 
reduction in poverty. Likewise, setting a relatively low (high) tax for goods that are complements 
(substitutes) with goods in the deprivation measure reduces poverty indirectly. The interpretation 
of the first term of the right hand side of (25) is completely similar to earlier tax analysis. The 
government is still constrained by asymmetric information, and it must design its tax schedules 
so that individuals’ incentive compatibility constraints are not violated. 16 
 
In terms of tax rates, commodity taxes should be the highest for goods for which the high-ability 
household have a relatively strong taste and that are substitutes with goods in the poverty 
measure. Commodity taxes should be the lowest for goods for which the low-ability households 
have a relatively strong taste and that are included in the deprivation measure or are 
complements with goods in the poverty measure. 
 
3.3  The Atkinson-Stiglitz separability result 
 
As shown originally by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), the incentive effect vanishes if consumer 
preferences are separable between goods and leisure. In this case, the demand of different 
commodities does not vary with the wage rate (or labour supply), and the first term at the right of  
(25) is always zero. However, even with separable preferences, the second term at the right in 
(25) is still positive or negative.  
                                                 
16 Christiansen (1984) shows that goods that are negatively related to labour supply should be taxed relatively more. 
Holding income constant, a reduction in hours worked can be achieved by an increase in skills. Therefore, a good 
for which people with higher abilities have stronger taste is negatively related to labor supply. 
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The Atkinson-Stiglitz result is often used as an argument against the use of differentiated 
commodity taxation as a redistributive device. Direct income transfers (as a part of an optimal 
income tax scheme) would be sufficient instead. In the present context, there is no reason to 
suppose that influencing income is better than affecting the consumption of the commodities. 
The poverty index depends directly on the consumption of some the commodities, and it is in the 
interest in the government to promote their consumption. This also implies that income-based 
targeting is not necessarily superior to targeting based on consumption goods.17  
 
The fact that the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) separability result does not hold remains valid also 
in other non-welfarist formulations. While the second-best arguments would not require 
differentiated commodity taxation, the first-best term implied by non-welfarist objectives is still 
needed to correct differences between private and social value of consumption. 
 
3.4  Effective marginal tax rates 
 
To obtain the necessary conditions for the effective marginal tax rates, (23) is differentiated with 
respect to v and z:  
 0'})({ =−∂∂+− µµλ vufpxfxP ncvcvx , (28) 
                                                 
17 Note finally that these results can also be linked to the taxation of savings. When different commodities are 
interpreted as consumption in different points in time, the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) result implies that savings 
should not be taxed. But when the government objective is poverty minimization, the tax schedule of savings also 
depends on which commodities are included in the poverty measure. A plausible case in practice is one where the 
poverty index is measured based on current consumption. This measurement, which can be defended at least if 
poverty is transitory, would imply a relative encouragement of present over future consumption, in other words, a 
positive tax rate on savings.  
 
  22
 0)()( == nn µµ , (29) 
 0})({))1(( =∂∂+−++ zufpxPxP nczzczx µλ . (30) 
The main condition for optimality, (30), may be rewritten as  
 )(111)1( pxnzb ssPsf
txstx −+−=++− λπ , (31) 
where s  is defined to be the marginal rate of substitution between z (=ny) and expenditure on 
goods; b, that are taxed on linear scale, i.e. ),,,(/),,( nzvqEvvnzxs zbz −==  and xzP PPs /=  is 
the paternalist marginal rate of substitution. As in Mirrlees (1976), the left-hand side of (31) 
measures the total increase in the tax liability (including commodity taxes and the income tax), 
or the effective marginal tax rate, of a household when income increases.  
 
Consider the end point at the top of income distribution. Then the transversality condition in (29) 
implies that the first term at the right of (31) is zero. Assuming that ss p > , then  the second 
term is positive in (31). In other words the effective marginal tax rate is positive. When the 
government minimizes poverty, the second term at the right of (31) takes the form czx pcD− . 
Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004) show that the standard result in optimal tax analysis – there should 
be no distortion at the top – carries over to the present case with poverty minimization, whereas 
at the bottom of the income distribution, the marginal effective tax rate should be negative. 
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3.5  Merit goods and commodity taxation 
 
Familiar arguments for public intervention include distributional concerns and the existence of 
market failures. The notion of merit goods, initiated by Musgrave (1959), is used as another 
motivation for public intervention that is distinct from those cases above. Examples for merit 
good arguments are easy to find in reality. Compulsory education is perhaps the most-well 
known example of merit goods, whereas banning drug use is used to protect consumers from a 
harmful demerit good. In all such arguments, the principle of consumer sovereignty is ignored. 
The government’s intervention is thought to be justified, since consumers make faulty choices. 
Public policy is then designed to correct consumers' choice, often against their will.  
 
First-best commodity tax rules for merit goods, derived in the situation where there is no need to 
resort to distortionary taxation, are directly targeted to correct the difference between private and 
social valuations of these goods. In second-best situation with distortionary linear taxation, 
Ramsey-type rules emerge. Consumption of commodities that are complements with the merit 
goods should be encouraged, while substitutes should be discouraged (see e.g. Besley 1988). 
 
Racionero (2001) considers linear commodity taxation in the presence of merit goods when the 
government has access to non-linear income taxation as well.18 She utilises a merit good 
modeling due to Besley (1988), where individuals disregard the beneficial impact of 
consumption of one good on health, whereas the health effect is taken into account in the 
government’s assessment of individual welfare. Assuming that preferences are weakly separable 
                                                 
18 Racionero (2000) examines the case where individuals also differ in their preferences over the merit good, but 
government only utilises income taxation. 
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between consumption and leisure – when no commodity taxes would be needed without merit 
good considerations – there should still be a subsidy on the consumption of the merit good. The 
size of the subsidy is shown to be a sum of two elements. It depends, first, on the average of the 
marginal effects on health over individuals of different income level. Second, a covariance term 
emerges, which measures the dispersion of the marginal effects on health across population. If, 
for instance, workers with low income-earning ability are more sensitive to the subsidy (increase 
the consumption of the merit good relatively more when subsidized), the subsidy tends to be 
higher.19   
 
Using the technique of section 2 we can formulate the merit good optimization procedure. 
Suppose that the individuals do not care about additional positive effects of certain goods on 
health, while the government does. This divergence can be expressed in the following way20 
 )(),,( mhymxuu g += , (32) 
where gu  reflects government’s preferences and u refers to individuals’ preferences. h(m) 
denotes the health function (h’>0 and h’’<0). 
 
Using partially indirect utility functions we write the government’s welfare function as follows 
 ∫ += dnnfmhnbyqvW )())(),,,(( , (33) 
                                                 
19 Racionero (2001) also demonstrates how merit good concerns affect the optimal (effective) marginal tax rates on 
income. The effective marginal tax rate at the top of the income distribution should be negative, while its sign is 
ambiguous at the bottom of the distribution. 
20 Similar modelling has been used by Racionero (2001) and, more generally, by Besley (1988). 
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where ∑ += mqxqb mii . Now with weakly separable preferences we can derive the implicit 
commodity tax formula for a merit good 
 ∫∫ −= fdnmmhfdnmt cqcqm )('1λ , (34) 
where cm  is compensated demand. The left hand side of (34) measures the extent to which 
commodity taxation encourages/discourages consumption of merit good. The term on the right 
hand side measures the impact of health effect of merit good. Since 0<cqm , the term is positive, 
suggesting that the consumption of merit good should be encouraged. In terms of tax rates, 
commodity tax on merit good should be low or negative (a subsidy). 
 
4.  Behavioral Public Economics 
 
This section discusses some recent ideas in normative behavioral economics and attempts to 
show their direct connection to the general non-welfarist structure developed in the paper. We 
shall see that the key feature of exercises in behavioral public economics has been to highlight a 
term in optimal taxation formulae that captures the impact of actual individual preferences being 
different from what the individual would wish them to be (and therefore what he or she would 
want the government to use in formulating policies to change behavior). 
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4.1  Pensions 
 
One area where public economists have traditionally built on behavioral assumptions is analysis 
of pensions. Insufficient savings by workers for their retirement can be seen as one key argument 
for public pension systems or compulsory pension contributions. 
Diamond (2003) offers an excellent synthesis on public economics viewpoints on pension policy. 
Therefore, very brief notes on some aspects on the literature suffice here. Diamond (2003, 
chapter 4) and Diamond and Mirrlees (2000) consider a benchmark situation where individuals 
do not save at all. Workers are otherwise identical, but their skills differ (as in Mirrlees 1971), 
and the government’s objective is to design optimal redistributive policy for the working age and 
for the retired. Another assumption is myopic labor supply by young workers, who simply ignore 
the implications of their earnings when young on the retirement income.  
 
A specification that gives rise to striking conclusions is one where individual utility is additive in 
the following way: 
 )1()()( 21 ywcvxvu −++= , (35) 
where x and c denote consumption when young and when retired, respectively, n is the wage rate 
and y is labor supply when young. Myopic labor supply implies that retirement consumption 
does not enter the incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore, if the social welfare function 
exhibits inequality aversion, the optimal retirement consumption is shown to be higher for those 
whose lifetime income has been smaller. 
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A more plausible policy rule arises from a framework where another assumption with behavioral 
motivations is made. Suppose that preferences are not additive over time; moreover there is a 
standard-of-living effect from the first period consumption on the utility from the retirement 
consumption. Preferences could then be given by 
 )1(),( ywxcvxu −++= . (36) 
Equation (36) is used by the government when transforming individual welfare to social welfare. 
Individuals, in turn, ignore the impacts on second-period consumption when making labor supply 
decisions. They therefore maximize apparent utility given by 
 )1( ywxu −+= , (37) 
The government’s optimization is therefore constrained by a self-selection constraint that 
depends on the apparent utility alone. In an extreme case, the second period utility could only 
depend on the replacement rate xc / . It is shown that in this case, the optimal replacement rate is 
decreasing in n.21 There are also more refined formulations on the impacts of realistic, 
behavioral, assumptions on pension policy. An example is Diamond and Köszegi (2002) who 
explicitly model the underlying reason for myopia by building on quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  
 
Using the tools of non-linear income taxation Diamond (Ch 4, 2003) derives the marginal tax 
formula for the first-period income 
 
f
susvWT nxx λ
µ
λ −=
'
' , (38) 
                                                 
21 Diamond (2003, chapter 6) also incorporates myopic behaviour to the analysis of retirement incentives when all 
workers have the same skill level, but their disutility of labour differs. 
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where 'W  is the derivative of the social welfare function with respect to individual utility. The 
rule above is similar to one presented in equation (14) of section 2. Again the difference between 
the optimal tax rate in this type of world and that under conventional theory is the first term on 
the right hand side. It is a first-best motive for taxation. In (41) this term corrects internality 
because individuals ignore the impacts on second period consumption in their labor supply 
decisions. 
4.2  Reference incomes 
 
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983) and Tuomala (1990), for example, consider the 
implication of utility interdependence (or 'envy') – the situation in which individual's utility is 
negatively affected by others' income – on optimal income taxation. There is nowadays ample 
evidence that people indeed care about their relative positions (see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald 
2004).  
 
However, it is not clear whether utility interdependence should be allowed to enter the social 
welfare function: is envy a trait one wants to honor? For example, Harsanyi (1982) does not 
accept antisocial preferences such as envy, malice etc in a utilitarian social welfare function. 
Unlike earlier studies (Boskin and Sheshinski(1978), Oswald (1983) and Tuomala (1990)), we 
avoid here this criticism. Utility interdependence affects the way people behave, which the 
government must take into account as a constraint when designing tax schedules, but envy is not 
included in the government objective function.  
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All individuals are supposed to have the same tastes, represented by the utility function 
µ,,( yxu ), where x is consumption, y is the amount of work done and µ a reference income level 
which depends on the aggregate income in the society. The government objective function takes 
the form ∫nn dnnfyxu )(),(ˆ . In other words, it does not include reference income. Now we can 
reinterpret our model in section 2. 
 
The optimal marginal tax rate formula  can be written as follows 
 fsunssunzT nxx λµλ /)(/))ˆ(ˆ())((' −−= , (39) 
where s is again the (individual) marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income 
(including envy effect) and 
x
y
un
u
s
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ −= denotes the social marginal rate of substitution. The 
second term at the right is again familiar from the welfarist literature, whereas the first term is 
novel. It captures the social value of divergence between private (including envy effect) and 
social preferences (no envy). It corrects the envy effect to correspond to social preferences.  
 
4.3  Sin taxes 
 
One reason why people can end up making choices against their own good is excessive 
discounting of future. This may result in e.g. overconsumption of goods which offer initial 
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satisfaction but belated suffering. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) consider how a paternalistic 
government could respond to such a situation by designing appropriate, corrective, ‘sin’ taxes.22   
 
We can capture some of the arguments developed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) in the 
present, general, framework. Consider a case where all consumers have self-control problem. 
Utility is ),,,(* nzaxuu = , where a is a ”sin” good. (x is untaxed). All consumers have some 
degree of self-control problem so that there is an over-consumption of a. By contrast, optimal 
behavior maximizes ),,,*(* nzaxuu = , so that *** aa > .  Otherwise the model is the same as 
the one used in section 3. Now we have 
 ∫∫∫ −−= fdnaPdnanfdnat cqancqa λπ 1)( , (40) 
With weakly separable preferences (the first term on the right hand side is zero) we have 0>at , 
i.e. the consumption of the sin good should be taxed. If the first term of the right is non zero, the 
optimal commodity taxes are a combination of traditional welfarist concerns and the need to 
influence the consumption of harmful good. 
 
An alternative formulation of sin goods might be one where the degree of irrationality is 
assumed to vary across individuals. As optimal taxation exercises where agents differ in two 
respects (as ability and tastes) are difficult, we concentrate on a simpler case where individuals 
do not differ in terms of their income-earning ability. Utility may now be defined by β,,( axu ), 
where ß is an index of irrationality, with density f. The government objective function takes the 
                                                 
22 They use a variant of Ramsey taxes, i.e. linear commodity taxation. 
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non-welfarist form ∫= ββ ββ dfaxuNW )(),(ˆ . In other words uˆ  is the social utility derived from a  
ß individual’s consumption. Now we can reinterpret our model in section 2. 
 
The optimal marginal tax rate formula can be written as follows 
 fsussuT xx λβµλ β /)(/))ˆ(ˆ( −−=′ , (41) 
where s is again the (individual) marginal rate of substitution between a and x and 
x
a
u
u
s
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ β−= denotes the social marginal rate of substitution. The second term at the right is again 
familiar from the welfarist literature, whereas the first term is novel. It captures the social value 
of divergence between private and social time preferences. Suppose that for the most irrational 
individual we have sˆ >s so that society would like to see him to consume less of the sin good 
than he would choose to do at any given prices. At the optimum the relative price of x faced by 
this individual is lowered to discourage his consumption of a. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
We have shown that non-welfarist optimal tax rules have an essentially simple common 
structure, with two key components. The first component captures the “first best” or 
“paternalistic” motive for taxation, because it arises from differences between social and private 
preference. The second component is the second best motive for taxation, to correct market 
distortions or to raise revenue in the least distortionary manner. Viewed in this light, exercises in 
behavioral public economics are seen to be applications of general non-welfarist public 
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economics, with the focus on the first of the two components mentioned above. For whatever 
reason, individuals do not pursue their own best interests, which opens up the case for the 
government to intervene in order to induce them to do so. Thus the government uses a different 
set of preference from those generating individual behavior, which is precisely what is meant by 
non-welfarist welfare economics. Since behavioral public economics is one manifestation of 
non-welfarist public economics, it is not surprising that optimal behavioral tax rules have the 
same general structure as optimal non-welfarist tax rules. As behavioral economics expands, and 
as more results are derived for specific cases, we hope that our exposition will serve to provide a 
broad framework in which new results can be better appreciated, and better related to earlier 
results and to each other. 
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